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Carl H. Coleman∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Influenza pandemics have been a regular occurrence through-
out human history.
1
  One difference between contemporary pandem-
ics and those of the past is that today we have the capacity to develop 
life-saving pharmaceutical interventions in the form of vaccines and 
antiviral medications.  Unfortunately, while these interventions 
should provide significant benefits to many people, the supply is like-
ly to fall considerably short of the demand.  An effective vaccine is 
unlikely to be available until approximately six months after the onset 
of a pandemic,
2
 and even after a vaccine is developed, there are un-
likely to be sufficient supplies to vaccinate more than a small fraction 
of the world’s population.3  As for antiviral medications, although the 
United States is close to reaching its goal of stockpiling eighty-one 
million treatment courses, the Institute of Medicine estimates that 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, Seton 
Hall University School of Law.  These brief remarks were presented in October 
2008—before the emergence of the current H1N1 pandemic—as part of the Seton 
Hall Law Review Symposium: Preparing for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic 
Influenza.  The author would like to thank the other panelists and audience mem-
bers at the symposium for a lively and informative discussion. 
 1 See John G. Bartlett, Planning for Avian Influenza, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
141, 141 (2006) (noting that influenza pandemics have typically occurred several 
times each century). 
 2 See Y. Guan et al., A Model to Control the Epidemic of H5N1 Influenza at the Source, 
BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Nov. 13, 2007, at 6, http://www.biomedcentral.com/ 
content/pdf/1471-2334-7-132.pdf (concluding that “at most only a third of the glob-
al human population may have the chance of getting the vaccine at least six months 
after the pandemic strain is identified”); see also World Health Org., Avian Influenza 
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/ 
avian_faqs/en/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
 3 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Alan Wertheimer, Who Should Get Influenza Vaccine 
When Not All Can?, 312 SCI. 854, 854 (2006) (suggesting that “more than 90% of the 
U.S. population will not be vaccinated in the first year” of a pandemic); Lori Uscher-
Pines et al., Priority Setting for Pandemic Influenza: An Analysis of National Preparedness 
Plans, 3 PLOS MED. 1721, 1721 (2006) (“At current capacity, we cannot expect to 
vaccinate more than 14% of the world’s population within a year of a pandemic.”). 
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more than twice that amount might be needed to treat twenty-five 
percent of the population and to provide prophylactic treatment to 
workers likely to be infected on the job.
4
  Moreover, it is not even 
clear if the stockpiled medications will be effective.  This year, the 
dominant strain of the seasonal influenza virus has proven resistant to 
Tamiflu, the primary stockpiled drug.
5
  If similar resistance develops 
in a pandemic influenza strain, existing stockpiles could turn out to 
be useless. 
The limited availability of vaccines and antiviral medications dur-
ing a pandemic means that difficult decisions will have to be made 
about how to allocate these resources.  Questions about allocating 
scarce life-saving resources are not, of course, unique to pandemic 
situations.  For example, the demand for transplantable organs con-
sistently exceeds the supply,
6
 and, as a result, complex regulatory sys-
tems have been developed to ensure that organs are allocated fairly 
and consistent with medical need.
7
  However, existing systems for al-
locating scarce resources like organs provide only limited guidance 
for the type of decisions that will arise during an influenza pandemic.  
First, during a pandemic, decisions will have to be made under crisis 
circumstances, in the face of social unrest as well as uncertain and 
evolving medical information.  Regulatory systems will have to be flex-
ible and responsive, and allocation criteria may have to be based on 
broad generalities rather than case-by-case assessments of individual 
needs.  Second, unlike decisions about allocating organs, the impact 
of which is felt primarily by individual patients, decisions about allo-
cating vaccines and antivirals will have significant implications for all 
of society.  For example, because influenza is infectious, individuals 
denied access to vaccines or antivirals will not only have a greater like-
lihood of becoming ill and dying, but they will also have a greater 
chance of infecting other persons.  Similarly, denials of care to essen-
tial service providers, such as health care workers or key government 
 
 4 COMM. ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTIVIRAL MEDICATION STRATEGIES FOR AN 
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, INST. OF MED., ANTIVIRALS FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: GUIDANCE 
ON DEVELOPING A DISTRIBUTION AND DISPENSING PROGRAM 28 (2008), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309118662&page=28.  
 5 See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Major Flu Strain Found Resistant to Leading Drug, Puz-
zling Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at A10. 
 6 Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional Picture 
Based on Integration of Available Information, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 955, 955 
(2007), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-039370.pdf. 
 7 In the United States, the system of organ allocation is managed by the United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), under contract with the Department of Health 
and Human Services.  See generally UNOS: Who We Are, 
http://www.unos.org/whoweare/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
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officials, may increase risks to third parties by undermining society’s 
ability to mount an effective response to the pandemic.  As a result, 
prioritization systems will have to take into account the externalities 
of treatment denials, in addition to the impact on the individuals 
seeking care. 
While the details of national pandemic preparedness plans vary, 
the general approach takes to the question of allocating vaccines and 
antivirals is substantially similar.
8
  Overall, the primary goal is to save 
the most lives possible, while simultaneously reducing social disrup-
tion and economic losses.
9
  These are certainly valuable goals, partic-
ularly in the context of a crisis in which society’s very existence may 
be threatened.  Yet, underlying the decision to pursue these goals are 
several contestable value judgments that pandemic planners have not 
always made explicit.  My goal in these brief remarks is to highlight 
three of these judgments: (1) the view that all individuals’ lives de-
serve equal protection, regardless of age; (2) the view that individuals 
in particular occupational categories, especially “health care work-
ers,” necessarily deserve greater protection than the rest of the popu-
lation; and (3) the general assumption that the goal of prioritization 
systems should be to maximize aggregate social welfare at the lowest 
possible cost.  These are by no means irrational approaches to the 
challenge of allocating scarce life-saving resources, but they nonethe-
less have potentially problematic implications that warrant further 
discussion. 
II. APPROACHES TO THE ALLOCATION OF VACCINES AND ANTIVIRAL 
MEDICATIONS IN NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS PLANS 
As concerns about the potential for a new influenza pandemic 
have mounted, many countries have developed pandemic prepared-
ness plans that explicitly address the allocation of vaccines and anti-
viral medications.  In the United States, the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) has issued guidelines for the allocation 
of both vaccines
10
 and antiviral medications.
11
  For vaccines, the guide-
 
 8 See infra Part II.  
 9 See infra Part II. 
 10 See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., 
GUIDANCE ON ALLOCATING AND TARGETING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE 3–4 , available 
at http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/vaccination/allocationguide.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter DHHS, VACCINE ALLOCATION PLAN]. 
 11 See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON ANTIVIRAL DRUG USE 
DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, available at http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/ 
vaccination/antiviral_use.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter DHHS, 
ANTIVIRAL USE].  
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lines divide individuals into target groups and then, within the target 
groups, into tiers.
12
  The target groups include: (1) persons who 
“maintain homeland and national security”; (2) persons who “pro-
vide health care and community support services”; (3) persons who 
“maintain critical infrastructure”; and (4) “the general population.”13  
The first tier within each group would receive top priority for vacci-
nation.
14
  For the occupational groups—i.e., groups one through 
three—the first tier includes deployed forces, critical health care per-
sonnel, emergency medical service personnel, and fire and police of-
ficers.
15
  For the general population, tier one would be limited to 
pregnant women, infants, and toddlers, all of whom are expected to 
have a higher risk of dying during a pandemic.
16
  After individuals in 
the first tier of each group are vaccinated, supplies would be directed 
to persons in the second, third, fourth, and fifth tiers.
17
 
DHHS has also issued guidance for the use of antiviral drugs.
18
  
Initial priorities would focus on efforts to contain or suppress initial 
pandemic outbreaks anywhere in the world and to provide post-
exposure prophylaxis at the border to travelers entering the coun-
try.
19
  Then, the bulk of the stockpiled medications would be directed 
to persons infected with pandemic influenza who present themselves 
for care early in the course of their illness and who would benefit 
from antiviral medications.
20
  Other priorities include prophylaxis for 
health care workers, persons who have compromised immune sys-
tems, and persons living in residential settings such as nursing homes, 
prisons, and homeless shelters when outbreaks occur in those set-
tings.
21
  The guidelines recognize that existing stockpiles will be insuf-
ficient to cover all of these categories, and conclude that, when sup-
plies are limited, “treating all persons based on assessment of medical 
need is considered preferable to targeting certain priority groups for 
treatment.”22  They also recommend that, in situations of limited 
supply, treatment should be preferred to prophylaxis because “the 
 
 12 DHHS, VACCINE ALLOCATION PLAN, supra note 10. 
 13 Id. at 3. 
 14 Id. at 8. 
 15 Id. at 6. 
 16 Id. at 8–9. 
 17 Id. at 7. 
 18 See DHHS, ANTIVIRAL USE, supra note 11. 
 19 Id. at 1. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 16. 
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need is clear and benefits [are] likely to accrue for those who are 
treated.”23 
The DHHS guidance documents are intended to be advisory on-
ly.
24
  They do not purport to be binding on the state, local, and tribal 
planners who are the primary audience of the documents.  In fact, 
the vaccine guidance notes that “it is important that plans are flexible 
as the guidance may be modified based on the status of vaccine tech-
nology, the characteristics of pandemic illness, and risk groups for se-
vere disease—factors that will remain unknown until a pandemic ac-
tually occurs.”25 
Other countries’ prioritization plans differ in some respects 
from the DHHS guidelines, but in general reflect similar considera-
tions.  In a 2006 analysis of national pandemic preparedness plans, 
Uscher-Pines found that the overwhelming focus was on utilitarian 
factors.
26
  Thus, twenty-one plans emphasized the need to reduce 
morbidity and mortality, while thirteen referred to the maintenance 
of essential services or the “minimization of social and economic im-
pacts.”27  Individuals at high risk of infection were ranked consistently 
at the top of resource allocation schedules.
28
  In addition, health care 
workers and other essential service providers were given priority 
access in most national plans.
29
  Reasons offered for prioritizing 
health care workers included the fact that such individuals were at in-
creased risk of getting and transmitting infections, that they were ne-
cessary for recovery efforts, and that the availability of health care 
workers would reduce overall morbidity and mortality in society.
30
 
III. ASSESSING THE PLANS: AGE, OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES, AND THE 
PRIMACY OF SOCIAL UTILITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Existing prioritization plans share several common characteris-
tics.  I highlight here three features of these plans that I believe war-
rant greater attention.  First, the plans all seek to save the most lives 
possible without distinguishing between the value of lives based on 
 
 23 Id.  
 24 DHHS, VACCINE ALLOCATION PLAN, supra note 10, at 1. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Uscher-Pines et al., supra note 3, at 1724–26.  
 27 Id. at 1723. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 1723–24. 
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individuals’ ages.31  Second, they prioritize certain occupational 
groups, most commonly health care workers, but they often do not 
clearly define the contours of these categories.  Finally, they reflect 
the general view that maximizing aggregate social welfare should be 
the primary consideration in allocation decisions, despite the poten-
tial impact of such an approach on socially disadvantaged groups. 
A. All Lives Are Equal, Regardless of Age 
Existing plans for both vaccines and antiviral drugs seek to iden-
tify persons at the greatest risk of infection and death from the pan-
demic influenza virus and to ensure that these individuals have the 
greatest chance of receiving prophylaxis and treatment.  The implicit 
judgment is that, when resources are scarce, the primary goal should 
be to save as many lives as possible.  Some commentators have argued 
that such an approach is consistent with utilitarian ethical theories 
because, during a pandemic, the number of lives saved is the best 
measure of the aggregate social good.
32
  The view that all lives are 
equally deserving of protection can also be seen as consistent with 
egalitarian principles, insofar as it rests on the assumption that all in-
dividuals have inherently equal worth. 
Yet, a serious weakness of treating all lives as inherently equal is 
that such an approach ignores commonly held intuitions about the 
implications of aging.  In particular, the argument can be made that 
the value of additional life declines over the course of an individual’s 
lifespan.  This is why the death of a young person is typically per-
ceived as tragic, whereas the death of someone who has already lived 
a full life is not. 
The idea that young people’s lives are deserving of greater pro-
tection than the lives of older persons is sometimes referred to as the 
“fair innings” argument, which is based on the idea that everyone de-
 
 31 To the extent the U.S. plan incorporates age-related preferences, it is based on 
predictions about which age groups will face the highest risk of death during a pan-
demic, not on the principle that saving the life of a younger person is more impor-
tant than saving the life of an older person.  In fact, the plan recommends that, in 
some cases, older adults should be given higher priority than healthy young adults, 
given “the much higher risk of severe illness and death experienced by older adults 
in two of the previous three pandemics.”  DHHS, VACCINE ALLOCATION PLAN, supra 
note 10, at 10. 
 32 See Marcel Verweij, Equitable Access to Therapeutic and Prophylactic Measures, 
ADDRESSING ETHICAL ISSUES IN PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING: DISCUSSION PAPERS 8 
(World Health Organization, Geneva, Switz. 2008), http://www.who.int/csr/ 
resources/publications/cds_flu_ethics_5web.pdf (“If we consider human life to be of 
central value, consequentialism supports allocation of resources so as to save as many 
lives as possible.”). 
COLEMAN (FINAL EDIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/13/2010  4:59 PM 
2009] ALLOCATING VACCINES 1117 
serves to live through all the “innings,” or phases, of life.33  According 
to one formulation of this argument, “[o]lder persons will have had 
many more opportunities in their life than persons who die at young 
age and therefore, when we can save some but not all, it is fair to save 
younger people first.”34  The fair innings argument reflects the view 
that fairness does not necessarily mean that everyone should have 
equal access to the same amount of resources, but that everyone 
should have an equal chance to live a complete life. 
The pure version of the fair innings argument would give the 
greatest preference to the youngest members of society—i.e., in-
fants—on the ground that they have the most years of life ahead of 
them.  A variation of the argument, proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel 
and Alan Wertheimer, would balance the amount of time a person 
has left to live against the amount of time the person has already in-
vested in living.
35
  With this “investment refinement” to the standard 
fair innings argument, a 20-year-old person would have greater prior-
ity than an infant “because the older individuals have more devel-
oped interests, hopes, and plans but have not had an opportunity to 
realize them.”36  Emanuel and Wertheimer note that, during a pan-
demic, their approach would direct resources to individuals in the 
age cohorts at highest risk of infection during the 1918 Spanish flu.
37
 
The insight that additional life years have diminishing value as 
individuals become older poses a serious challenge to the view that 
the goal of resource allocation should be to save as many lives as poss-
ible without attention to age.  However, age-based prioritization sys-
tems also raise concerns of their own.  First, even if we were to agree 
that the number of years a person has left to live is a relevant crite-
rion for allocating vaccines and antivirals, age is not always an accu-
rate proxy for life expectancy.  Factors such as genetics, health status, 
and lifestyle also play important roles.  Thus, basing prioritization de-
cisions solely on age would not necessarily result in saving those 
people with the greatest number of years left to live.
38
  Second, any 
 
 33 See id. at 10; see also Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration of the 
“Fair Innings” Argument, 6 HEALTH ECON. 117, 119 (1997). 
 34 Verweij, supra note 32, at 10. 
 35 Emanuel & Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 854–55. 
 36 Id. at 855. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See Michael M. Rivlin, Why the Fair Innings Argument Is Not Persuasive, BMC MED. 
ETHICS, Dec, 21, 2000, at 4, http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6939-
1-1.pdf  (“It is in fact not possible for two patients to have an identical condition, 
bearing in mind the differences between both of a medical and, just as importantly, a 
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official policy that treats the lives of those closer to death as less de-
serving of protection creates the danger of reinforcing biases and dis-
crimination against the elderly. 
These concerns, however, are not a sufficient justification for 
completely excluding age from prioritization decisions.  While age 
may not correlate perfectly with life expectancy for every individual, it 
is undeniable that, on average, there is a strong correlation between 
the number of years one has lived and the number of years one has 
left.  In general, prioritization systems are based on the aggregate 
impact of particular factors on a population level, even though indi-
vidual exceptions to these general patterns will inevitably occur.  For 
example, pregnant women are given top priority for vaccines in the 
DHHS plan because, on average, they face a higher risk of dying if 
they become infected.
39
  The average correlation between pregnancy 
and mortality is sufficient to justify the heightened priority, even 
though the correlation does not mean that every single pregnant 
woman who becomes infected during a pandemic would necessarily 
die. 
The risk that an age-related prioritization system would exacer-
bate ageism is certainly a serious consideration.  However, the signi-
ficance of this risk may depend on how a system of age-related prefe-
rences is implemented.  For example, giving a bump up in priority to 
broad categories like “adolescents” and “young adults” may pose less 
of a risk of fostering biases against the elderly than a sliding scale ap-
proach in which each additional year of life is treated as a negative.  
For this reason, the World Health Organization has recommended 
that, if countries choose to incorporate age-related considerations in 
vaccine and antiviral allocation systems, such categories should “rely 
on broad life stages, rather than ranking individuals based on differ-
ences of only a few years.” 40 
B. Membership in Particular Occupational Categories Justifies Priority 
Access to Resources 
A consistent feature of national pandemic preparedness plans is 
the prioritization of certain occupational categories, particularly 
health care workers.  The logic of this approach is that, if individuals 
 
social kind, that might have a significant effect on the health and prognosis of indi-
viduals.”).  
 39 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 40 WORLD HEALTH ORG., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING A PUBLIC 
HEALTH RESPONSE TO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 6–7 (2007), http://www.who.int/csr/ 
resources/publications/WHO_CDS_EPR_GIP_2007_2c.pdf. 
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who are essential to the pandemic response effort become ill and die, 
many more people are likely to die as a result.  Thus, saving essential 
workers means that everyone will be better off. 
As a general matter, it is hard to argue with the general idea of 
giving preferential treatment to individuals who are genuinely essen-
tial to the pandemic response effort.  In fact, even commentators who 
are strongly opposed to the use of general “social worth” criteria in 
resource allocation decisions approve the preferential treatment of 
individuals necessary to respond to crisis situations.  Paul Ramsey, for 
example, argued that “we should be indiscriminate in the care we 
provide—just as God makes the rain fall on the just and the unjust 
alike,” but that in a “focused community” in which survival of the 
group is the primary objective, favoring those who contribute essen-
tial functions can be seen as a legitimate goal.
41
 
Giving priority in resource allocation to essential health care 
workers is particularly justifiable if those individuals will have to as-
sume greater-than-normal risks to their own health in order to carry 
out their job responsibilities.  For example, health care workers who 
are exposed to influenza patients are likely to face a significantly 
greater risk of infection than the general population.
42
  Offering 
these workers protection against infection may be a necessary incen-
tive to get them to agree to work.
43
  In addition, providing access to 
vaccines and antivirals to individuals who expose themselves to life-
threatening risks as part of the pandemic response effort can be justi-
fied by the ethical principle of reciprocity, which states that those 
who make sacrifices for the benefit of society have a greater claim to 
benefits from society in return.
44
 
Nonetheless, basing preferential treatment on specific occupa-
tional categories is problematic because the categories are inherently 
broad and may be difficult to contain within reasonable limits.  For 
 
 41 See James F. Childress, Just Care: Rationing in a Public Health Crisis, UPDATE (Lo-
ma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr., Loma Linda, Cal.), Sept. 2005, at 1, 4 (citing PAUL RAMSEY, 
THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 275 (1970)). 
 42 See Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals 
to Work During an Influenza Pandemic, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (noting that 
“[h]ealth care professionals who participate in the pandemic response effort are like-
ly to face a significantly greater risk of infection than the rest of the population,” and 
that, during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic of 2003, 
health care professionals accounted for nearly twenty percent of confirmed SARS 
cases worldwide). 
 43 See id. at 42 (arguing that health care professionals who volunteer to work dur-
ing a pandemic should receive priority access to vaccines and antivirals). 
 44 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 40, at vi. 
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example, should the category of “health care worker” include only 
professionals with unique life-saving abilities, such as infectious dis-
ease specialists, or should it include anyone who works in a setting 
that provides health care—including, for example, janitorial staff or 
members of the billing department?  If the goal is to ensure the con-
tinued functioning of hospitals and other health care providers, then 
arguably anyone necessary to the maintenance of that institution 
would have a claim to priority access.  Yet, if anyone who works in a 
health care institution is entitled to priority, it will be hard to justify 
differential treatment for others who provide equally valuable societal 
benefits, such as day care providers, bus drivers, or sanitation work-
ers.  In other words, unless the concept of “essential worker” is li-
mited to an extremely narrow category of lifesavers, any distinctions 
that are drawn may be perceived as arbitrary and hence unfair. 
Reflecting these concerns, the New York State Task Force on 
Life and the Law recommended against prioritizing health care 
workers and other first responders for access to ventilators during a 
pandemic.
45
  According to the Task Force, if ventilators are in short 
supply, prioritizing health care workers could mean that anyone who 
is not a first responder would lack a realistic chance of having access 
to ventilators.
46
  The Task Force also pointed out that prioritizing 
health care workers could lead to “the appearance of favoritism, in 
which those who devised the rationing system appeared to reserve 
special access for themselves.”47 
Rather than giving priority access to broad occupational catego-
ries, planners should develop more finely tuned criteria for identify-
ing individuals whose services are genuinely essential.  Any expansion 
beyond these narrow criteria should depend on a showing that an in-
dividual will be required to assume greater-than-normal risks as a re-
sult of performing services that will benefit the greater social good. 
 
 45 NEW YORK STATE WORKGROUP ON VENTILATOR ALLOCATION IN AN INFLUENZA 
PANDEMIC, NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ALLOCATION OF 
VENTILATORS IN AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: PLANNING DOCUMENT 27–28 (2007) (draft 
for public comment), available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/ 
communicable/influenza/pandemic/ventilators/docs/ventilator_guidance.pdf. 
 46 Id. at 27. 
 47 Id. at 28.  The Task Force noted that, although it rejected giving priority to 
health care workers for access to ventilators, the considerations might be different 
for decisions about vaccines and antivirals.  See id. 
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C. Promoting Aggregate Social Welfare and the Impact on Vulnerable 
Populations 
A general concern with utilitarian-based approaches to the allo-
cation of scarce life-saving resources is that they may conflict with 
other important societal values, particularly the values of equality and 
non-discrimination.  The problem is that, if the primary goal is ensur-
ing that resources are deployed in the most cost-effective manner 
possible, entire segments of the population may end up receiving 
nothing.  For example, developing a mechanism for delivering vac-
cines and antiviral medications to hard-to-reach rural populations will 
inevitably cost more than using those resources in concentrated ur-
ban settings.
48
  Sending resources to developing countries, and help-
ing those countries deploy those resources in the absence of well-
developed health care infrastructures, will entail similar inefficien-
cies.  In general, many of the most vulnerable segments of society 
would suffer under a system that focuses primarily on the cost-
effective deployment of resources, including individuals who are 
home bound or who have significant mobility restrictions, individuals 
whose literacy or linguistic limitations prevent them from being easily 
reached with public service messages, and individuals who face bar-
riers in access to health care because of membership in stigmatized 
social groups. 
The impact of utilitarian-centric resource allocation policies on 
vulnerable populations is particularly problematic in light of the fact 
that individuals who are economically and socially disadvantaged 
would probably suffer the greatest burdens of an influenza pandemic.  
According to one recent study, if the next pandemic has mortality 
patterns comparable to the 1918 Spanish flu, ninety-six percent of 
deaths will occur in the developing world.
49
  Moreover, during the 
Spanish flu, individuals from “lower social classes and [socially] op-
pressed groups had substantially higher mortality rates than the do-
minant or ruling population” in both wealthy and developing coun-
tries.
50
  Despite these concerns, the authors of the study found that no 
country had systematically identified vulnerable populations in the 
context of pandemic response efforts.
51
  Rather, discussions of vulne-
rability have been limited to individuals at “increased biological or 
 
 48 See Verweij, supra note 32, at 9–10. 
 49 Lori Uscher-Pines et al., Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Social Justice and 
Disadvantaged Groups, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2007, at 32. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 35. 
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medical risk of” infection or death.52  Only two of the plans surveyed 
even mentioned “the barriers that the poor and other disadvantaged 
people are likely to face in securing access to vaccines and antiviral[]” 
medications.
53
 
In other contexts, we already accept that the pursuit of social 
utility must be tempered with equality-based considerations.  For ex-
ample, Robert Veatch points out that our system for allocating organs 
explicitly rejects several inequitable criteria that would make sense 
from a purely utilitarian perspective.
54
  For example, the system does 
not rely on HLA antigen matching for kidney transplantation, in part 
because such an approach would systematically favor white over black 
organ recipients.
55
  Similarly, the allocation system ignores “reliable 
data showing that people of a certain age, race, income group, and 
gender [do] predictably slightly better” as kidney recipients.56  Veatch 
also argues that efforts to promote wider geographical regions for or-
gan sharing also reflect “a victory for the justice perspective” over de-
fenders of pure efficiency approaches, as broad geographic distribu-
tion “tends to favor equality of access, based on need, over 
efficiency.”57 
Even the most ardent supporters of taking equality considera-
tions into account in resource allocation decisions do not deny that 
maximizing social utility is an important ethical value.  The question 
is ultimately one of balance—i.e., we must decide “how far [we] are 
willing to have the overall level of health of the community reduced 
in order to reduce inequalities in the distribution of health.”58  At 
some point, attempting to compensate for economic and social dis-
advantages by deploying greater resources to vulnerable populations 
can itself be seen as inconsistent with respect for equality if the 
greater resources devoted to the vulnerable make it impossible to 
care for other segments of society.  Yet, in order to strike this balance, 
the conflict between utility and equality must first be acknowledged.  
Existing preparedness plans do not even take this first step. 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 37. 
 54 Robert M. Veatch, Disaster Preparedness and Triage: Justice and the Common Good, 
72 MT. SINAI J. MED. 236, 239–40 (2005). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 240. 
 57 Id.  
 58 Williams, supra note 33, at 122–23. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Existing plans for allocating vaccines and antivirals during a 
pandemic are rational responses to a problem with no ideal solution.  
Yet, several aspects of these plans deserve further consideration, par-
ticularly with respect to the role of age, the relevance of occupational 
categories, and the impact of utility-based considerations on vulnera-
ble populations.  While no plan can perfectly resolve the competing 
considerations, it is essential that the trade-offs are made explicit and 
subject to broad public deliberation.  This symposium has served a 
valuable role in fostering this kind of discussion. 
 
